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THE POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY OF COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS: A COMMENT ONJOHNSTON
MATTHEW
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ADLERt

The legal institution of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) may end up
producing outcomes with lower social welfare (overall well-being),
relative to the outcomes that would have been produced had the institution not been in place. This is easy to see, in a general way. What
are much harder to understand are the various and potentially interacting mechanisms that generate slippage between the internal aim of
CBA and its actual outcome, and to determine which institutionCBA, risk-risk analysis, benefits-only analysis, benefits-only analysis constrained by technological feasibility, or some other institution'-in
fact maximizes social welfare within a given regulatory domain. Jason
Johnston's article, A Game Theoretic Analysis of Alternative Institutionsfor
Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis,' sheds much light on these issues. More
generally, the article constitutes a substantial contribution to the positive political theory of regulation. My brief Commentary, however,
will focus on what Professor Johnston's article says or implies about
the welfare effect of CBA and its alternatives.
CBA might reduce welfare because: (1) CBA has direct procedural costs. Time and money need to be expended to perform a costbenefit analysis.
(2) Agencies are epistemically imperfect. They
might make frequent mistakes in performing CBA and fewer mistakes
in applying some other test that is reasonably well correlated with
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I See generally LESTER B. LAvE, THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL REGULATION: DECISION
FRAMEWORKS FOR POLICY 8-28 (1981) (describing possible regulatory decision procedures in the area of social regulation).
2 Jason ScottJohnston, A Game Theoretic Analysis of
Alternative Institutionsfor Regulatoy Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1343 (2002).
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overall well-being.
(3) Agencies may seek to maximize goals other
than the goals specified by statute, and it may be harder for political
principals-namely Congress and the President-to monitor agency
compliance with CBA than with other, clearer goals that are reasonably well correlated with overall well-being. (4) Even an epistemically
perfect and faithful agency that could perform CBA with zero direct
costs would not necessarily produce welfare-maximizing outcomes,
given "wealth effects." CBA evaluates outcomes by aggregating the
amounts that individuals are willing to pay or accept, in dollars, for
the outcomes. One person, however, could be willing to pay more for
an outcome than another would require to accept it, even though the
outcome harms the second more than it benefits the first.6
Eric Posner and I describe these sources of slippage between CBA7
Analysis.
and social welfare in our article, Rethinking Cost-Benefit
Johnston identifies a very different mechanism that bears on the welfare comparison of CBA and alternatives, namely firm lobbying and litigation,which is in turn driven by-and potentially revealing of-firms'
compliance costs. At the heart of Johnston's article is a formal gametheoretic model with roughly the following structure. An agency decides whether or not to issue a firm-specific regulatory directive. If the
agency issues the directive, the regulated firm can lobby for Congress
or the President to impose political sanctions on the agency and, later,
can litigate to overturn the directive. The agency can drop the regulation after the lobbying stage or finalize the regulation and defend it in
court if the firm challenges it there. Both the firm and the agency can
expend varying amounts on lobbying and litigation, which will in turn
influence the size of the political sanction imposed on the agency and
the probability of success in court." Johnston analyzes firm and
agency behavior under two scenarios: first, under a "benefits statute,"
where the agency is instructed to maximize some statutory benefit
(such as health or environmental purity), and the regulated firm cannot judicially challenge the directive on cost-benefit grounds;9 and
4 Id. at 217.
5 Id. at 218.
6

Id. at 191-94; Matthew D. Adler, Incommensurability and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 146

U. PA. L. REV. 1371, 1398-1401 (1998); Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When PreferencesAre Distorted,29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1105, 1122-24,
1136-41 (2000).
7 Adler & Posner, supra
note 3.
8 Johnston, supra note
2, at pt. I.A.
9 Id. at pt. I.B. Johnston's model includes the possibility of a statutory
benefits
threshold, such that directives with benefits below the threshold are subject to judicial
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second, under a substantive "cost-benefit statute,'' which includes a
judicially enforceable requirement that the costs of agency regulation
not exceed the benefits, so that the regulated firm will prevail at the
litigation stage for certain, or at least probabilistically, if the firm's
costs of complying with the regulatory directive are greater than the
directive's benefits.
Crucially, this model does not presuppose any of the sources of
slippage between CBA and social welfare that Eric Posner and I described. The agency can costlessly calculate the benefits of the directive. In addition, at least under certain conditions, the agency is able
to determine costlessly the firm's compliance costs." Thus, at least
under certain conditions, agency CBA has zero direct costs and the
agency is epistemically perfect. Further, and interestingly, the agency
is public spirited and does not "shirk" from statutory goals in a radical
way. The agency genuinely seeks to maximize the statutory benefit,
rather than seeking to maximize its budget, its power, or its own view
of good policy.
Under the "benefits statute" scenario, the agency does not shirk at
all: the statute instructs the agency to maximize some benefit type,
which is exactly what the agency prefers to do. Under the "substantive
cost-benefit statute," the agency shirks insofar as it fails to internalize
the statutory cost constraint, but remains genuinely committed to the
primary goal of the statute, namely to advance health, environmental
purity, safety, or whatever other benefit type is specified by the statute.
Finally, "wealth effects" have no essential role in Johnston's model. It
is quite consistent with the model to assume that the numerical magnitudes that figure therein, and that drive agency and firm behaviorthe benefit from the regulation (B), the political sanction (D), the
lobbying costs (ef and e.), the litigation costs (Lf and L.), and the compliance cost (c)-are measured on a scale of interpersonal utility
rather than a dollar scale. 2 If so, the proposition that B is greater
than c for a given regulatory directive entails that the issuance of the
directive-leaving aside lobbying and litigation costs-increases social
invalidation. In my Commentary, I ignore this feature of the model and assume that
the threshold is set at zero.
10 Id. at pt. I.C.1. Johnston also models "procedural" CBA. Id. at pt. I.C.2. In this
Commentary, given space limitations, I do not consider what Johnston says about pro-

cedural rather than substantive CBA.
1 This will occur if is zero up front. Infra text accompanying notes 14-15.
12 See generally ROBIN BOADWAY & NEIL BRUCE, WELFARE ECONOMICS 137-69 (1984)
(discussing interpersonal welfare comparisons and describing various scales for measuring outcomes with respect to welfare).
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welfare.
Notwithstanding the absence of wealth effects and the existence of
epistemically perfect, faithful agencies that can costlessly calculate the
benefits and (under some conditions) the costs of regulation, CBA
can produce outcomes that are no better than, and perhaps even
worse than, the outcomes produced by alternative institutions. How?
Let me describe and comment on the dynamics of Johnston's model
relevant for my purposes.
(1) A benefits statute can "sort" between welfare-enhancing and welfarereducing directives by inducing the agency to promulgate regulatory directives
against low-compliance-costfirms but not against high-compliance-costfirms.
Consider the case of a benefits statute. In this scenario, the parameters of Johnston's model are: B, the benefit from regulating;
D(e., ef), a lobbying function that gives the political sanction (D) as a
function of agency and firm lobbying effort (e. and ef); r(L,' Lf), a litigation function that gives the probability of judicial reversal of the
agency (r) as a function of agency and firm litigation effort (L, and
Lf); and I, the cost to the agency of learning the firm's compliance
cost up front. If I is zero, then the agency is epistemically perfect because it already knows B and the model parameters and can (by assumption) costlessly learn the firm's costs. There are two kinds of
firms: firms with low compliance costs (c), where c, <B, and firms with
high compliance costs (c,), where B < c .13
Assume for now that I is in fact zero; the agency knows the firm's
compliance costs up front. 4 Then, given certain values of B, D, and r,
the agency will promulgate the directive regardless of whether the
firm at hand is low cost or high cost. Given other values of B, D, and r,
the agency will fail to promulgate the directive regardless of whether
the firm at hand is low cost or high cost. But there are some values of
B, D, and r such that the agency will promulgate the directive if and
only if the firm at hand is a low-cost firm. In this last scenario, the
agency is induced to "sort" between cost-benefit-justified and costJohnston, supra note 2, at pts. I.A-B.
In the discussion that follows, I assume that in the limiting case where I = 0 and
the agency can costlessly learn up front what the firm's compliance costs are, it knows
whether the firm is high or low cost prior to issuing the directive. Formally, where
I = 0 and it would be costless for the agency to learn about compliance costs, then the
agency's prior probability that the high-cost firm is indeed high cost is 1, and its prior
probability that the low-cost firm is indeed low cost is 1. In effect, where I = 0, the
agency has perfect information from the very beginning. This assumption simplifies
my discussion and, in particular, permits me to separate the effects of lobbying and
litigation within Johnston's model from the effect of asymmetric information.
13

14
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benefit-unjustified directives-to promulgate the former but not the
latter-notwithstanding the absence of a CBA requirement in the underlying statute. 5
Why does the "sorting" scenario occur? It occurs because of the
effect that firm lobbying and litigation have on the agency's expected
net benefit from enacting the directive, and because high-cost firms
have a greater incentive to lobby and litigate than do low-cost firms.
Consider the final, litigation stage of the game. An incremental increase in the probability of reversal benefits the high-cost firm more
than it benefits the low-cost firm because it generates an incremental
reduction in expected cost (the change in probability times the cost of
compliance) that is greater for the high-cost firm. As a result, the
high-cost firm would spend more at the litigation stage than the lowcost firm. This produces a lower expected benefit for the agency from
finalizing and litigating the directive, asJohnston explains:
[T]he higher is the firm's compliance cost, the higher will be the
amount that the firm will spend challenging the regulation in court, and
hence the higher will be the agency's optimal expenditure in defending

the regulation. The higher is the agency's expenditure at the judicial
review stage, the lower will be its net benefit from the regulation, since

resources are diverted to le 6l defense that might have been used to
....
pursue other regulations

Thus the agency, considering whether or not to finalize and litigate the regulation, might determine that the expected benefits of doing so in the case of a low-cost firm are positive, but the expected
benefits of doing so in the case of a high-cost firm are negative. Of
course, the agency's expectations about its choice at the finalization
stage feed back to its choice at the initial, promulgation stage. Specifically, an agency that expected not to finalize a directive would have
no reason to promulgate the directive in the first place.
What about lobbying? Cost differentials generate differential incentives to lobby, just as they generate differential incentives to litigate. The maximum amount the firm is willing to spend at the lobbyThe reader might wonder whether, under a benefits or cost-benefit statute,
there is a difference between "sorting" at the promulgation stage and the finalization
stage. For example, could an agency be induced to promulgate directives against both
low-cost and high-cost firms, but then to refrain from finalizing a directive against the
high-cost firm but not the low-cost firm? Given Johnston's model, at least where I = 0
and the agency knows prior to issuing the directive what the firm's costs are, the finalization/promulgation distinction raised here is not important. Where I = 0, the agency
finalizes a directive whenever it promulgates it. Supra note 14.
16 Johnston, supra note 2, at 1364.
15
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ing stage is its compliance cost since the firm can assure itself of losing
no more than that by spending zero on lobbying and litigation. Assume that, by spending its entire compliance cost on lobbying, the
low-cost firm would still fail to generate a political penalty sufficiently
large to create an expected negative benefit for the agency at the
litigation stage. However, if the high-cost firm spends ef, where
c, < e < c,, the sanction thereby generated would deter the agency
from finalizing the regulation. The agency, expecting all this at the
initial stage, would promulgate a regulation against the low-cost firm
but would not promulgate a regulation against the high-cost firm.
Although the effect of lobbying and litigation on agency incentives within Johnston's model are complex-even with the simplifying
assumption that the agency is epistemically perfect-the basic point
that firm compliance costs affect lobbying and litigation incentives,
and thereby might prompt the agency to "sort" between welfareenhancing and welfare-reducing directives, is intuitive, very important,
and quite general. 7 This sorting function of lobbying and litigation
would occur across a range of models formalizing agency behavior
under a "benefits" statute. For example, imagine an incredibly simple
model where the agency decides whether or not to promulgate a directive that realizes some nonzero benefit (B); there is no lobbying
stage; if the directive is promulgated and judicially challenged, the
firm and the agency must pay a fixed litigation cost (L); and the court
reverses the directive with probability r, which is a decreasing function
of B. Then if B (1 - r) < L and rx c, < L < rx c, the agency will promulgate the directive against the low-cost firm but not against the highcost firm.
Or, imagine a different incredibly simple model where (once
again) the agency decides whether to promulgate a directive that realizes some nonzero benefit (B); if the agency promulgates, the firm
can lobby at a specified cost (E) and, by doing so, overturn the direc17

Here and below, in discussing whether the benefits statute and the cost-benefit

statute do or do not "sort" between welfare-enhancing and welfare-reducing directives,
I generally focus on the costs and benefits of the directive itself and-for the sake of
simplicity-ignore the additional social costs of lobbying, litigation, and information
gathering. Conceivably, an agency might issue and finalize a directive the benefits of
which exceed compliance costs, but the benefits of which are exceeded by the sum of

compliance costs and agency and firm litigation and lobbying costs. Reciprocally, a
statutory framework might induce an agency to refrain from finalizing a directive with
negative net benefits, but only by producing lobbying costs greater than the direct cost
of enacting the directive. A full social-welfare analysis of the costs and benefits of
benefits statutes and cost-benefit statutes would certainly need to consider such possibilities.
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tive and trigger the imposition of some sanction on the agency; litigation costs are zero and the epistemically perfect court always upholds
the directive. Then if c, > E > c, the agency will promulgate the lowcost directive but not the high-cost directive.
(2) A cost-benefit statute can fail to sort between welfare-enhancing and
welfare-reducing directives.
Consider the case of a cost-benefit statute. " In this scenario, the
parameters of Johnston's model are B, D, and I as before. Again,
low-compliance-cost and highthere are two types of firms:
compliance-cost with c, < B < c. Assume, as before, that the agency is
epistemically perfect (I = 0). In the simplest case considered by
Johnston, the court is also epistemically perfect and judicial review is
costless; 9 in such a case, the court will with certainty uphold the directive against a low-cost firm, and will with certainty overturn the directive against a high-cost firm. Thus, in this simplest case, the agency
will never have an incentive to issue a directive against the high-cost
firm and will always issue a directive against the low-cost firm (at least
assuming that B - D_ > 0, where D_ is the maximum value of the political sanction that might be imposed on the agency). If the agency
issues the directive against the high-cost firm, the court will inevitably
reverse the directive, regardless of agency or firm litigation or lobbying effort; and so the expected benefit from regulation cannot be
greater than zero. If the agency issues the directive against the lowcost firm, then the court will inevitably uphold the directive, regardless of agency or firm lobbying or litigation effort; and so the expected
benefit from regulation is no less than B -D,.
However, the assumption that judicial review under the cost°
benefit statute is perfect and costless is not only "unrealistic," as
Johnston notes, but also creates an asymmetry with the benefits scenario, where the court has a nonzero probability of making a mistake,
and where this probability is responsive to litigation effort by the firm
and agency. Johnston drops this assumption in the course of his
analysis, and instead assumes that the probability ofjudicial reversal of
the directive is given by r(L o, L., B/c), where-as in the benefits scenario-an increase in agency effort increases the probability that the
court will uphold the directive, an increase in firm effort decreases
that probability, and an increase in the benefit/cost ratio increases
18 SeeJohnston, supra note 2, at pt. I.C.1 (describing the structure and dynamics of
his model in the case of a cost-benefit statute).
19 Id. at 1371-73.
20 Id. at 1373.
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the probability that the court will uphold the directive. 2' With the
model thus specified, all the outcomes possible under the "benefits"
statute also are possible here: with some values of B, D, and r, the
agency will promulgate directives against low-cost firms but not against
high-cost firms. However, with different values of B, D, and r, the
agency will promulgate directives against both kinds of firms, and with
yet different values of B, D, and r, the agency will fail to promulgate
directives against either kind of firm. Because of firm lobbying and
litigation, a statute that not only instructs the agency to apply a costbenefit test, but also makes CBAjudicially reviewable, might nonetheless fail to induce the agency to sort between welfare-enhancing and
welfare-reducing litigation.
How is this possible? The firm, whether low cost or high cost, as
under the benefits statute, can increase the probability of reversal at
the litigation stage by spending more on litigation. Depending on the
"productivity" of firm litigation effort, it could be that the agency's
expected net benefit of finalizing and litigating the directive is negative-even in the case of the low-cost firm. An agency, expecting
negative net benefits at the litigation stage, would not promulgate the
directive in the first place. Similarly, lobbying might be sufficiently
productive of political sanctions that the firm (whether low- or highcost) could reduce the agency's expected net benefit at the litigation
stage to below zero. The reciprocal situation is also possible. If the
reviewing court is sufficiently inaccurate, and Congress and the President are unwilling to impose substantial sanctions on the agency, then
the agency might expect to reap positive net benefits from finalizing
and litigating a directive against both the high-cost and the low-cost
firm, regardless of firm lobbying and litigation effort.
Once more, the point that firm lobbying and litigation could induce the agency to act in ways inconsistent with the underlying statutory standard is intuitive, very important, and very general. It is easy
enough to imagine a range of models of agency regulation under a
cost-benefit statute---even by epistemically perfect, nonshirking agencies-that would prompt the agency to promulgate, or fail to promulgate, both welfare-enhancing and welfare-reducing regulations."

21
22

Id. at 1374-75.
An important example is Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit

Analysis: A Positive Political Theory Perspective, 68

U. CHI. L. REv. 1137, 1179 (2001),
which presents a formal model of regulation where "the introduction of cost-benefit
analysis results in ... more projects being implemented, including projects that fail
cost-benefit analysis."
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(3) Asymmetric information bears upon the institutional analysis:
whether "sorting" between welfare-enhancing and welfare-reducing directives
occurs under a "benefits" statute or a "cost-benefit statute" may depend upon
whether thefirm possesses information that the agency lacks.
Much of the literature on cost-benefit analysis focuses on the implications of generalized uncertainty-for example, on the prediction
and monetization of the nonmarket benefits that would flow from environmental, health, or safety regulation. 3 Johnston rightly emphasizes that asymmetric information, rather than symmetric ignorance,
may obtain for some categories of costs or benefits. In particular,
within his model, the firm knows its compliance costs, but the agency
does not initially unless it pays Ito learn the firm's costs." The agency
is, to this extent, epistemically imperfect. To see the implications of
asymmetric information, assume that I is quite large-sufficiently
large that the agency would never pay it. Thus, prior to the lobbying
stage, the agency does not know the firm's compliance costs. Even so,
the level of firm lobbying might reveal whether the firm has high or
low costs. If it does not, then the agency, in calculating its expected
net benefit from finalizing and litigating the regulation, will need to
factor in the possibility that the firm might be high cost. Given this
possibility, the expected benefit is lower than it would be (ceteris paribus) were the agency sure that the firm was low cost. So, the agency
could end up declining to finalize a regulation that it would have finalized (and initially promulgated), had it known the regulated firm
was low cost. To put the point a bit more generally, increasing I from
zero to a high level-under both the benefits statute and the costbenefit statute-can shift the model from an equilibrium where the
agency promulgates and finalizes regulations against only low-cost
firms to an equilibrium where it fails to promulgate and finalize regulations against either kind of firm.
Johnston is correct that informational asymmetries must be considered in predicting regulatory outcomes under cost-benefit regimes
and alternatives, and that informational asymmetry may have a different effect on these outcomes than symmetric ignorance. Asymmetric
23

See, e.g., Adler & Posner, supra note 3, at 216-38 (discussing the implications of

generalized uncertainty for CBA); see also A. MYRICK FREEMAN, THE MEASUREMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE VALUES:
THEORY AND METHODS 219-72 (1993)

(same); Steven Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique,REGULATION, Jan.-Feb.
1981, at 33, 36-40 (same); Lester B. Lave, Benefit-Cost Analysis: Do the Benefits Exceed the
Costs, in RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED: GETTING BETTER RESULTS FROM REGULATION

104, 114 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996) (same).
24 Johnston, supra note 2, at
pts. I.A, I.B.2.
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information and generalized uncertainty should not be conflated. On
the other hand, the importance of asymmetric information for CBA
should not be exaggerated. Consider environmental regulationJohnston's paradigm. Regulatory directives requiring firms to reduce
pollution might be specified in general technological terms ("best
available technology"), specific technological terms (specifying
different technologies for different types of firms and pollutants),
performance terms focused on physical compounds (firm emissions of
a given compound must not exceed x ppm), or performance terms
focused on human risk (firm activities must not impose an
incremental fatality risk exceeding x in 1 million) . Only in the first
case would firms plausibly possess private information about the
26
benefits of proposed regulation.
Indeed, Johnston focuses on asymmetric information with respect
to regulatory costs, not benefits. 2' Firms plausibly do have asymmetric
information with respect to the directfinancial costs of regulatory directives formulated in technological terms. It is less clear whether firms
typically will have asymmetric information with respect to the direct
financial costs of regulatory directives formulated in performance
terms. 2s For example, if the agency requires that firms' emissions of
substance S must be reduced to x ppm by year Y, and this requirement
is "technology forcing" in the sense that the best technology currently

25

These are hardly the only alternatives. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, A New Gen-

eration of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 21-37, 94-127 (2001) (describing traditional, technology-based environmental regulation and alternatives).
26 Plausibly, at the time of the rulemaking, the proposed regulatees would know
the best available technology for controlling the targeted process, while the agency
might not.
27 In an extension of his model, Johnston does discuss the possibility
that the
agency might have better information about benefits than the firm. Johnston, supra
note 2, at pt. II.B.
28 Cf WINSTON HARRINGTON ET AL., ON THE AccuRAcY OF REGULATORY COST
ESTIMATES 5-7, 15, 20-23 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 99-18, 1999)
(studying empirically the accuracy of governmental estimates of regulatory compliance
costs and finding that governmental bodies overestimated compliance costs because
they failed to predict the full effect of new technology), available at
http://www.rff.org/disc-papers/PDF__files/9918.pdf.; Eban Goodstein & Hart Hodges,
Polluted Data: OverestimatingEnvironmental Costs, AM. PROSPECT, Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 64,
67-69 (discussing how the EPA overestimated compliance costs for its acid rain program because it failed to account for the flexibility of markets to develop cheaper and
more efficient cleanup technologies); James K. Hammitt, Are The Costs of Proosed Environmental Regulations Overestimated? Evidence from the CFC Phaseout, 16 ENVTL. &
RESOURCE ECON. 281, 282-84, 293-97 (2000) (explaining that unpredictability regarding firms' responses to changing legal conditions makes cost estimation uncertain and
analyzing specifically the EPA's overestimation of the costs of CFC regulations).
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available does not suffice to reduce S emissions to a level of x ppm,
then the agency and the firm may be symmetrically ignorant of the direct financial cost of this regulation. Or, if the agency puts in place a
performance-based, marketable permit scheme requiring each firm to
either (1) reduce its emissions to a given level, or (2) purchase the
right to pollute from other firms that have reduced their emissions below that level, then once again no individual firm will have asymmetric
information about its compliance cost. That cost will depend on the
market price for pollution rights, which in turn depends in large part
upon the willingness of other firms to supply such rights and on their
demand for such rights.2
Finally, it bears emphasis that the direct financial costs of a regulatory directive are only a subset of its total costs. Consider the following taxonomy of costs of environmental regulation, taken from Harrington, Morgenstern, and Nelson.

Johnston recognizes that the firm's informational advantage with respect to
compliance costs depends on how the agency frames its directive. Johnston, supra note
2, at 1411.
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Table 1: A Taxonomy of Costs of Environmental Regulation
DIRECT COSTS
Private Sector Compliance Expenditures
Capital
Operating and Maintenance
Public Sector Compliance Expenditures
Capital
Operating and Maintenance
Government Administration of Environmental Studies and Regulations
Monitoring
Enforcement
Other Direct Costs (Including Negative Costs)
Legal and Other Transactional
Shifted Management Focus
Disrupted Production
Waiting Time
Intermedia Pollutant Effects
Other Natural Resource Effects
Changes in Maintenance Requirements of Other Equipment
Worker Health
Stimulation of Innovation in Clean Technologies
INDIRECT COSTS
General Equilibrium Effects
Product Substitution
Discouraged Investment
Retarded Innovation
Transition Costs
Unemployment
Plant Closures

Public sector compliance expenditures, government administration costs, intermedia and other natural resource effects, effects on
worker health, and general equilibrium effects are all cost categories
where firms seem unlikely to have better information than agencies.
I do not mean to deny the role of asymmetric information in shap-

30

This table is derived from HARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 28, at 8 tbl.1.
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ing the outcomes of regulatory institutions, particularly CBA, but
rather to caution against overemphasizing that role. A natural refinement to Johnston's model, responsive to this concern, would be
the following: make the total costs (c) of a regulatory directive equal
to compliance costs plus other costs; assume that firms and agencies
both know, or are symmetrically ignorant, with respect to these other
costs; assume that firms themselves care about compliance costs, not
other costs; make the likelihood of reversal (r) in the cost-benefit scenario a function of the ratio of benefits to total costs, not compliance
costs; and evaluate the success of the benefits statute and the costare cost-benefit justibenefit statute in sorting between directives that
s
fied and unjustified in light of their total costs.3
(4) The level of firm lobbying effort may reveal private information, specifically the firm's compliance costs, to the agency.
One of the great insights of game theory is that actors may find it
strategically rational to act in ways that reveal facts which the actors, or
some of them, might prefer to conceal. Paradigmatically, this occurs
in a "signaling" model through a "separating equilibrium." 32 In
Johnston's model, it is the low-compliance-cost firm that prefers to
conceal its costs from the agency. Under some conditions, the agency
does not learn up front what the firm's costs are, but does learn these
costs at the lobbying stage. More precisely, asJohnston explains:
Suppose that the agency will drop the regulation if and only if it learns
that the firm has high compliance cost [and has not learned that up

front by spending I].... In this case, the unique... equilibrium calls for
the high-cost firm to identify itself and forestall regulation by making a
very high lobbying expenditure. To see this, suppose that the high-cost
firm sets its lobbying expenditure just equal to its total expected cost...
if it does not succeed in using lobbying to reveal its type. Because optimal litigation and lobbying expenditures increase with the firm's com-

pliance cost, we know that this expenditure is more than the low-cost
firm's total expected cost if the regulation is finalized. Hence the low-

cost firm will be better off if the

regulation

is finalized ... than if the low-

cost firm were to match the high-cost firm's lobbying expenditure.

This is a wonderful formal result, but it is unclear whether the features of the model that produce it are replicated in the real world.
There must be some activity, costly to firms, such that (1) highs SeeJohnston, supra note 2, at pt. II.B (discussing how mutual agency and firm
uncertainty about costs and benefits might be incorporated intoJohnston's model).
32

See, e.g., ERic

RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION:

AN INTRODUCTION TO

GAME THEORY 205-22 (2d prtg. 1990) (discussing signaling models).
33 Johnston, supra note 2, at 1369.
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compliance-cost firms have an incentive to engage in the activity more
intensely than low-compliance-cost firms on the assumption that
(2) the intensity with which the firm engages in the activity would be
known to the agency which (3) would rationally and correctly infer
from that the firm's compliance-cost type. The suspect premise here,
and a crucial one, is the second: agencies can observe the firm's activity level (in Johnston's model, the firm's lobbying effort), notwithstanding the agency's ignorance of the firm's compliance-cost structure.
But why wouldn't the level of firm lobbying be just as much "private information" to the firm as its compliance-cost level? Agencies do
not observe how much firms pay their lobbyists or how much internal
staff time is spent on lobbying, and the total level of firm contributions that directly or indirectly benefit an agency's political principals
is information which is not available at low cost to environmental and
other such regulatory agencies. To be sure, regulatory agencies conceivably could issue subpoenas to firms, requiring firms to disclose
their lobbying effort,34 but if this avenue for revealing private firm information is open to the agency, then the agency-at a similar cost,
presumably-could issue a subpoena requiring the firm to disclose its
compliance cost. Nor of course could a firm, credibly, simply tell the
agency what its lobbying expenses are; low-compliance-cost and,
therefore, low-lobbying-effort firms would have an incentive to make
inflated claims about lobbying effort, which would render all firms'
claims incredible.
Finally, there might be some activity, other than lobbying, the intensity level of which is observable (at zero or low cost) by the agency
and reveals to the agency the firm's compliance costs (either indirectly, by revealing lobbying effort, or directly). However, I am not
sure what that activity would be. More precisely, I doubt whether
there is an activity, internalto the regulatory process, whose intensity is
observable (at zero or low cost) by the agency, and which high-cost
firms, in order to communicate their cost structures to the agency,
might engage in more intensely than low-cost firms. Firm expenditures on the lobbying of political principals, on litigation, and for that
matter on the lobbying of the agency itself during the notice-andcomment process, are not (I would guess) observable by agencies at
substantially lower cost than the cost of investigating compliance costs

34 See generally 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE § 4, at 133-84 (3d ed. 1994) (reviewing agency subpoena power).
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directly3 5 To be sure, this is an empirical issue-one that bears investigation. Johnston does not cite any empirical literature on the costliness to agencies of observing firms' lobbying and regulatory process
activities; there could be empirical work of which I am not aware that
bears out his assumption that lobbying and the like is closer to public
than private information.
Note that, even if the intensity with which the firm engages in
lobbying and other activities internal to the regulatory process is not
cheaply observable by agencies, there might be extrinsic activities that
are cheaply observable and that theoretically could give rise to a separating equilibrium informative of firm compliance costs.
Why
wouldn't a high-cost firm, seeking to avoid regulation, burn a pile of
$100 bills outside the agency's windows after allowing the agency to
count the bills and verify that they are not counterfeit? Whether firms
actually would engage in these sorts of extrinsic, observable activities
to signal their regulatory costs to agencies is an important issue for the
institutional designer. It bears on the welfare comparison of CBA versus alternatives, assuming that there is asymmetric information about
compliance costs. If, under the conditions propitious for a separating
equilibrium, high-cost firms would in fact engage in these extrinsic activities to signal their costs to agencies, then agencies would learn that
information under those conditions, and agency regulatory choices
would be influenced by the information. More regulatory sorting between high- and low-cost firms likely would occur. Once more, the issue is really empirical: for the high-cost firm to burn the observable
dollars and thereby influence agency choice, the firm must be sufficiently rational to realize it can signal costs by doing so, the agency
must be sufficiently rational to infer the firm's cost structure from its
pyrotechnics, and the firm must be reasonably confident that the
agency is sufficiently rational to draw this inference.
(5) Perversely, requiring the agency to engage in cost-benefit analysis may
reduce social welfare. Shiftingfrom a "benefits" statute to a "cost-benefit" statute may shift the regulatory equilibriumfrom a "sorting"equilibrium, where the
agency issues directives only against low-cost firms, to a "nonsorting"equilibrium, where the agency issues orfails to issue directives against both low-cost
and high-costfirms.

35 For example, consider the comment submitted to the
agency during the noticeand-comment period. Neither its length nor the names of the law firms, economic
consulting firms, etc., that prepared the comment would indicate reliably how expensive it was for the firm to prepare the comment. The quality of the data and analysis
might do that, but it is not necessarily cheap for the agency to determine quality level.
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Pick B, D, and . Assume, as throughout, that there are two types
of firms, low and high cost, with the c, <B < c, Consider first the regulatory equilibrium under the "benefits" statute; and then shift to the
"cost-benefit" statute, holding constant B, D, I, c, c,, and the proportion of low- and high-cost firms in the universe of regulated firms.
One of the remarkable results of Johnston's model is that given certain values of B, D, I, c, and c, we might shift from a "sorting" equilibrium under the benefits statute to a "nonsorting" equilibrium under
the cost-benefit statute. The agency, statutorily permitted to ignore
costs, issues directives only against low-cost firms; but the mere inclusion of a cost-benefit requirement in the statute actually leads the
agency to issue or refrain from issuing directives against both low-cost
and high-cost firms. This is completely perverse, of course, and quite
startling. A CBA requirement not only fails to increase welfare, it actually can reduce welfare 3 1-- despite the fact that CBA is costless and
that agencies do not shirk and are epistemically perfect (except perhaps for their ignorance of firm compliance cost).
What drives the result? First, assume that courts are very "deferential" to agencies' cost-benefit analyses; courts are very hesitant to determine that costs outweigh benefits when B itself is sufficiently
greater than zero. Then, under a cost-benefit statute, the chance of
either low-cost or high-cost firms prevailing at the litigation stage is
low. If, further, lobbying effort is relatively unproductive, and if the
probability of agency reversal is responsive to firm effort under a
benefits statute, then it is clear that shifting from a benefits statute to
the hypothesized cost-benefit statute can shift us from a sorting equilibrium to one where agencies issue directives against both types of
firms. Less intuitive is the converse result, namely that the shift might
induce the agency to decline to issue directives against both types of
firms. As Johnston explains, because the low-cost firm under a costbenefit statute has a lower probability of winning at the litigation
stage, it has a greater incentive to engage in type-concealing lobbying
expenditures. Thus the shift from a benefits statute to a cost-benefit
statute could increase firm lobbying to a level sufficient to induce the
agency not to finalize and litigate any regulations.
[S]ince both types of regulatory targets spend at the lobbying stage, and
the low-cost target actually spends more than under a benefits statute,
the lobbying spending that the agency expects to encounter will be
higher under a cost-benefit statute than under a benefits statute. The
Ignore here firm and agency litigation and lobbying costs as part of the welfare
calculus. Supra note 17.
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higher the expected target lobbying expenditure, the higher the
agency's political penalty if it goes ahead with the regulation. The
higher the agency's political penalty, the lower its perceived net benefit
from regulating. Thus under imperfect judicial review, some of what a
substantive cost-benefit statute appears to give the agency-an increased
likelihood that the regulation will withstand judicial review when the
target has low cost-is taken away by rational target behavior at the ear37
lier lobbying stage.

The crucial assumption in all this is that firms-low-cost firms, or
all firms-might have a lower probability of prevailing at the litigation
stage under the cost-benefit statute than under the benefits statute, at
a given level of firm and agency litigation effort. Formally, r(Lo, Lf) >
r(L,, Lf, B/C). I find this assumption quite puzzling. Why does a firm
have any chance of prevailing under a benefits statute where the benefits of the properly enacted regulatory directive (B) are nonzero? The
answer is that the firm can raise various statutory or constitutional
challenges to the directive-that the directive is outside the agency's
jurisdiction; that the procedures employed by the agency to enact the
directive were unconstitutional or in violation of the Administrative
Procedure Act; that the regulatory benefits are zero or negative (for
example, a putatively health-related directive actually produces more
illness); or that the structure of the agency that issued the directive is
unconstitutional-and the court might, erroneously, sustain the challenge. But presumably all of these legal challenges also would be available to
regulated firms under a cost-benefit statute. Proponents of cost-benefit
analysis do not propose eliminating all the other legal' claims that
firms and other regulated parties might use to challenge agency regulation. Rather, they propose to give regulated parties an additional
challenge, namely that the regulation's costs outweigh its benefits."

37Johnston, supra note 2, at 1374.
38 Perhaps this statement is too strong. Although the defender of cost-benefit

analysis presumably would not propose eliminating all the other legal claims that challengers to agency action might advance (constitutional claims, jurisdictional claims,
procedural claims, etc.), she plausibly might propose eliminating existing statutory decision criteria and replacing those with the cost-benefit criterion. Specifically, as
Johnston points out, one might imagine shifting from a benefits statute with a significant threshold to a cost-benefit regime without a threshold. A directive with belowthreshold benefits, but costs lower than benefits, would violate the benefits statute but
not the cost-benefit statute. Johnston, supra note 2, at 1372 n.62. Note, however, that
a benefits threshold is really a rough-and-ready way to incorporate cost sensitivity into
the statutory framework. Below-threshold directives are directives whose costs are
likely to be larger than their benefits. Otherwise, why have a threshold? So the shift
from a benefits statute with a high threshold to a cost-benefit statute is best seen as a
shift between types of cost-sensitive statutory regimes, rather than as a shift from a truly
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But if firms are strictly better equipped, legally speaking, under the
cost-benefit statute as compared to the benefits statute, it is hard to
see how the probability of reversal under the cost-benefit statute could
be lower than under the benefits statute at a given level of firm and
agency litigation effort.
What I am suggesting is that an additional constraint be placed on
the permissible values of r(L, L, B/c), the litigation function in the
cost-benefit model, namely: r(L, L, B/c) >_r (L., Lf), for a given L. and
L? where r(L,, Lf) is the litigation function under the benefits statute.
If this constraint is observed, is it still possible that shifting from the
benefits statute to the cost-benefit statute (holding constant B, D, I, c,
c,, and the proportion of low- and high-cost firms in the universe of
regulated firms) can shift the regulatory equilibrium from a sorting to
a nonsorting equilibrium? Can the shift to cost-benefit analysis, perversely, induce agencies to cease discriminating between welfareincreasing and welfare-decreasing regulation, even if agencies are
epistemically perfect (except, perhaps, about firm compliance costs)
and nonshirking, even if CBA is costless, and even if the statutory CBA
requirement comes into play (realistically) as an additional legal challenge available to firms rather than a wholly new legal framework that
displaces all previously available challenges? An affirmative answer to
this question would indeed be startling.

Let me close with some suggestions for further research, which
represent extensions of Johnston's article with respect to the issue I
have discussed here: the welfare comparison of CBA and alternatives.
These are not, necessarily, the items thatJohnston ought to take as his
top priority since, as I noted at the outset, the article illuminates many

cost-insensitive regime (that is, a benefits statute without a threshold) to a cost-sensitive
regime.
Nor is it clear that current defenders of a statutory cost-benefit requirement
would, indeed, favor converting existing benefits statutes with thresholds into straight
cost-benefit statutes, rather than converting them into hybrid statutes that would require both (1) above-threshold benefits and (2) benefits greater than costs. For example, it does not appear that the main House and Senate bills considered by the 104th
Congress-which came close to enacting a cost-benefit "supermandate'"-would have
superseded existing benefits thresholds. See Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional
Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L. REV. 247, 274-82 (1996) (describing costbenefit legislation considered by the 104th Congress, in particular House bills H.R.
1022, 104th Cong. (1995), and H.R. 9, 104th Cong. (1995); and Senate bill S. 343,
104th Cong. (1995)).
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political principals the option of reversing the regulation outright, in
lieu of, or in addition to, the option of sanctioning the agency. Finally, beneficiaries might be added to the picture. What happens if
beneficiaries are allowed to lobby the political principals or to intervene in the litigation assuming a regulation is finalized, where each
beneficiary realizes some percentage of the gross benefits of the regulation?
Fourth, it would be interesting to model variations in the legal
structure of CBA and to compare these variants of CBA to agency action under a "benefits" statute. Johnston in fact has pursued this tack
already. He models two variants of CBA: judicially enforceable substantive CBA (where a directive with costs greater than benefits is subject to judicial invalidation) and judicially enforceable proceduralCBA
(where the agency is required to engage in CBA, but is not bound by
its results). A third variant is a requirement to engage in substantive
CBA that is enforceable by some executive branch oversight body
(such as the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)), but not by
the courts. 41 Cost-benefit analysis in the federal government usually
takes this third form. It is in fact unusual for statutes to require CBA
with sufficient explicitness that an agency's failure to engage in CBA
would directly triggerjudicial invalidation. Many more statutes permit
but do not require CBA.42 Since 1981, executive orders have imposed
a substantive CBA requirement covering this scenario. The requirement is applicable except where CBA is prohibited by statute, and it is
policed by OMB but is not justiciable. A fourth variant, logically,
would be a procedural rather than substantive CBA requirement that
is enforceable by an executive branch oversight body but not by the
courts.
Why could a CBA requirement imposed by the President trigger
different outcomes from a statutory, judicially enforceable requirement? CBA policed by OMB or some such body could be more responsive to presidential preferences; it could be less, or at least differently, responsive to firm and agency effort; and it could be less, or
more, accurate. The possible differences between judicially enforceable and unenforceable CBA are worth investigating since one recur-

respect to the influence of Congress and the President on regulation).
41 Eric Posner's recent formal work on CBA focuses on the President/agency interaction and does not assume judicial enforcement. Posner, supra note 22.
42 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles,99
MICH. L. REV. 1651
(2000) (surveying health, safety, and environmental statutes for inclusion of costbenefit requirements and other forms of cost-sensitivity).
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rent proposal on Congress's "reinventing government" agenda is to
shift away from the executive order framework and give CBA a statutory grounding.4' How, if it all, would that change firm and agency
behavior?
Fifth, it would be worth modeling, and comparing, a wider array
of institutional possibilities than CBA (in all its variants) and the
"benefits" regime. Costs are, in effect, one kind of statutory constraint
on the choices of an agency that is given a certain type of benefit as its
statutory maximand. But environmental statutes, in practice, impose
a variety of different types of constraints on benefit maximization.
Some require that regulation be "technologically feasible." Others
require that the level of benefits be sufficiently high (the benefits
must be "substantial" or at least not "de minimis"). Still others require
that the benefit be realized in a particular way-for example, that the
agency aim at reducing death from cancer, even at the cost of increasing death from other causes. 4 It would be instructive to compare
agency and firm behavior under a naked benefits statute, or straight
CBA, to agency and firm behavior under statutes incorporating one or
more non-cost constraints on benefit maximization, or under statutes
4
incorporating some such constraints along with a cost constraint. 5
Finally, it would be worth testing Johnston's model, and variations,
empirically. There is a small but growing body of econometric scholarship that looks at the effects of CBA on agency outcomes. How can
43 See, e.g., Fred Anderson et al., Regulatory
Improvement Legislation: Risk Assessment,
Cost-Benefit Analysis, and JudicialReview, 11 DUKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 89 (2000) (surveying recent proposed statutes requiring CBA or similar analytic tools); Jeff Gimpel,
The Risk Assessment and Cost Benefit Act of 1995: Regulatory Reform and the Legislation of
Science, 23 J. LEGIS. 61, 79-89 (1997) (examining how congressional proposals in the
Comprehensive Risk Assessment and Cost Benefit Act of 1995 would affect regulatory
decision making); Sunstein, supra note 38, at 274-82 (discussing regulatory reform
proposals considered by the 104th Congress); W. Kip Viscusi, Economic Foundations of
the Current Regulatory Reform Efforts, 10J. ECON. PERSP. 119, 127-28 (1996) (explaining
different ways in which CBA can be incorporated into legislation).
See LAVE, supra note 1, at 8-28 (describing the range of statutory frameworks
for
environmental regulation and other types of social regulation); Sunstein, supra note
42, at 1663-67 (same).
45Johnston's model in its current form includes
a benefits threshold, Johnston,
supra note 2, at app., and thus could be used to test the effect on agency decisions of
moving from a benefits statute with the threshold set at zero to one where the threshold is higher, or of moving from CBA to a benefits statute with a nonzero threshold.
46 Good examples include ROBERT W. HAHN, REGULATORY
REFORM: ASSESSING
THE GOVERNMENT'S NUMBERS (AEI-BrookingsJoint Ctr. for Regulatory Stud., Working
Paper No. 99-6, 1999), available at http://www.aei.brookings.org/publications/
working/working_99_06.pdf; Maureen L. Cropper et al., The Determinants of Pesticide
Regulation: A Statistical Analysis of EPA Decision Making, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
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this be done systematically? How can a CBA requirement be captured
as an independent variable in a quantitative, empirical analysis where
the dependent variable is, for example, the net costs or benefits of
One possibility is intertextual; another is inagency regulation?
tertemporal; another is interjurisdictional. In other words, we might
compare federal agency action under statutes with a CBA requirement
to federal agency action under statutes without such a requirement.
We might compare action by federal "executive" agencies (subject to
the executive order requiring CBA) to action by federal "independent" agencies (largely exempt from that order). We might compare
action by federal agencies before and after 1981, the date of the first
general CBA order. Finally, we might compare action by state agencies in states with CBA requirements to action by state agencies in
47
other states.
Most empirical work on CBA to date, even quantitative work, has
not been grounded in a formal model. One of the many contributions of Johnston's article is that it has given us a rigorous basis for
econometric studies concerning the welfare effects of CBA.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: ANALYSIS AND EVIDENCE 123 (Roger Congleton ed.,
1996); Scott Farrow, Does Analysis Matter? Economics and Planningin the Department of the
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Project Selection at the U.S. Army Corps ofEngineers, 85 AM. POL. SC. REV. 429 (1991); and
Scott Farrow, Improving Regulatory Performance: Does Executive Office Oversight
Matter? (July 26, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
For other empirical work on the effect of CBA, see, for example, ECONOMIC
ANALYSES AT EPA: ASSESSING REGULATORY IMPACT (Richard Morgenstern ed., 1997);
EPA, EPA'S USE OF BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS: 1981-1986 (1987); THOMAS 0. McGARIrY,
REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL
BUREAUCRACY (1991); Arthur Fraas, The Role of Economic Analysis in Shaping Economic
Policy, 54 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 113 (1991); and Robert W. Hahn et al., Assessing
Regulatory Impact Analyses: The Failureof Agencies to Comply with Executive Order 12,866, 23
HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 859 (2000).
47 See Robert W. Hahn, State and Federal Regulatory Reform: A Comparative Analysis,
29 J. LEGAL STUD. 873 (2000) (describing regulatory review structures, including costbenefit analysis, in state governments).
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